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Welcome to the Fissured Labor Market, where
 For Whom You Work Matters More and More
The term fissure traditionally refers to splits or cracks in objects ranging from parts of the body 
to the face of a rock or surface of the earth.  Now, thanks to David Weil's The Fissured Workplace, the 
term has entered labor market analysis, referring to splits between the wages/work conditions of 
employees inside a firm and the wages/conditions of the growing network of subcontractors, 
independent contractors, freelancers and consultants who work as non-employees outside the firm's 
legal boundary.    
Standard economic analysis posits a unitary labor market which determines the compensation of 
a work, which depends primarily on worker skills. The human capital model relates earnings/ 
productivity to investments in education and experience without reference to the specific employing 
unit.1 This is because a well-functioning labor market should produce similar pay for people doing 
similar work, regardless of whether they work in company A or B or industry X or Y.  If the marginal 
revenue product (MRP) of workers with given skills exceeds the market wage (W), the firm will 
increase output/employment to equate the diminishing MRP to W.  It will not pay workers the 
difference between their marginal contribution to revenues and the going wage.2  If a business 
generates excess profits, other firms will enter its market and drive wages up by competing for labor 
and drive prices down by increasing market output.  Subject to costs of mobility, imperfect information, 
and other frictions, competition will produce more or less equivalent compensation and productivity 
among firms.3
A fissured labor market is the polar opposite of the ideal competitive model.  In a fissured labor 
market firms pay workers doing the same work differently depending on the situation of the employer.  
When work conditions or benefits are bad, pay may be higher per compensating differentials, but more 
likely than not the best firms will lead others in all dimensions of compensation. The result is that the 
entity for whom a worker works will greatly affect compensation, creating the splits or cracks in the 
labor market that justify the f-term.  
This essay summarizes evidence that the US has experienced an unprecedented divergence of 
earnings among firms – fissuring of the labor market – and that this divergence accounts for much of 
the trend rise in earnings inequality that is making headlines in economic discourse.  I examine cases of 
fissuring in the hotel industry in Boston and present econometric evidence that the dispersion of 
earnings increased in that sector and nationwide.  I conclude with brief comments on the challenge the 
fissured market poses for economic analysis.
Case Evidence of Fissuring: hotel workers
The hospitality industry is big in Boston and adjacent locales. In the 2007 quinquennial Census 
of establishments, the Boston area had 385 hotels, including many famed brand-names like Hyatt or 
Hilton or Kimpton, that employed about 22,000 workers.  Some of the hotels were unionized but many 
were not.  Most of the brand-name hotels were and remain owned by franchisees rather than by the 
brand-names. And many hotels subcontract key services, such as room cleaning, to specialist firms.  
Taking the big brand-name hotels as exemplars of firms that subcontract essential work to 
outside entities,Weil recounts the summer 2009 decision of Boston's Hyatt Hotels to fire their 
housekeepers, many of whom had cleaned hotel rooms for years, and subcontract housekeeping to 
Atlanta-based Hospitality Staffing Solutions (Weil, pp 142-143).  Hyatt replaced its housekeepers with  
non-employee Hospitality workers for one reason: wage costs.  Hyatt paid its housekeepers about $15 
1 Save for firm-specific human capital which is intrinsically tied to the worker remaining at the firm over time. 
2 Efficiency wage aside.
3  Individuals will sort between companies depending on preferences and match-specific relations between them and the 
firm from which they/firm can earn some infra-marginal surplus.
an hour and provided the expensive health insurance and other benefits one associates with a profitable 
multinational.  By contrast, Hospitality paid its workers $8 an hour and spent little on benefits.  Had 
Hyatt tried to lower costs by reducing the pay of its housekeepers toward the Hospitality level, worker 
morale would almost certainly have plummeted; the low paid housekeepers would have distorted 
Hyatt's internal wage structure; and the company's reputation might have taken a long term hit.  
Outsourcing to Hospitality was the easy way to reduce costs and raise profits.
Fast forward to 2013-2014 and the housekeepers at a different Boston hotel – Hilton's Double-
Tree Suites located in a Harvard building near Harvard Business School.  As Table 1 shows, 
compensation and working conditions differ markedly between the Double-Tree and Boston's 
unionized hotels (including the Marriott Courtyard across the Charles from Double-Tree and Hilton's 
own Boston Downtown hotel) and between Double-Tree and comparable workers at Harvard, a 
building or so away.  Double-Tree paid less, spent less on worker health insurance, and most striking, 
required that its housekeepers clean more rooms per shift than competitors, producing worker 
complaints about injuries and pain from the work.
The differences between Hilton's Double-Tree and its Boston Downtown facility and 
comparable Harvard employees reflect the labor policies and collective bargaining agreements of these 
employers in a labor market open to wide variation in pay/conditions.  Compensation is set by Double-
Tree at Double-Tree, by the Boston area-wide union hotel agreement at the Downtown Hilton are set, 
by Harvard's SEIU contract for Harvard employees.  
Spurred by the intensity of work, limited company contribution to health-care, and poor 
treatment by some supervisors, in 2013 Double-Tree workers sought to unionize to improve their 
situation – a  painful and risky undertaking in 21st century America.  To sidestep the acrimony of a 
contested National Labor Relations Board election, the workers asked Harvard to support a card-check 
neutrality agreement to decide on unionization. There was precedence for such action.  In 2011 Harvard 
had brokered a neutrality agreement between the union and the Harvard subcontractor who delivered 
food and beverage services at the Harvard Law School.  But Harvard took a different stance toward 
Double-Tree, declaring that Double-Tree had sole responsibility for its employees. Its labor policies 
was none of Harvard's business.4  Parenthetically, as the union drive accelerated in 2014, Double-Tree 
raised pay and benefits for workers in what in a classic firm response to the threat of unionization.5 
Harvard justified its hands off policy toward workers on the grounds that Double-Tree is not a 
Harvard hotel. It is merely a tenant in a Harvard-owned building.6 However, the Double-Tree 
website informs Harvard-related customers that, “As a Harvard-owned hotel, we are pleased to offer all 
Harvard students, staff and alumnae a special discount off our Best Available Rates,” and emphasizes 
the connection by juxtaposing the University's Veritas insignia with the Double-Tree name.7  In fact, a 
substantial proportion of Double-Tree business is Harvard-connected and the University earns millions 
of dollars from its “non-ownership” involvement. 
If these examples and those in other industries in Weil's book were one-off cases of 
managements exploiting temporary differences in wages of similarly skilled workers while market 
forces were slowly moving them toward comparable levels, the cases would be interesting stories of 
sluggishness market adjustments. They would not be of sufficient economic importance for David Weil 
to have written his book nor for LERA to ask me for this essay.  But quantitative evidence on earnings 
for establishments and workers economy-wide shows that, far from being a temporary aberration, the 
4 Perhaps the University worried that a labor dispute at campus eating facilities risked student protests while it saw Double-
Tree as a financial investment unconnected to the campus. 
5 Ivan B. K. Levingston and Tyler S. Olkowski, “National Union Members Descend on DoubleTree for Protest”  
Crimson, June 30, 2014;  Sarah Feijo, Protesters demand fair union process at Harvard-owned DoubleTree hotel”  
http://cambridge.wickedlocal.com/article/20140626/NEWS/140627305 
6  Marco J. B.Grossi, “Allston Task Force Addresses DoubleTree Hotel”, Crimson September 10, 2013
7 www.hiltonfamilyboston.com/harvard, accessed July 10, 2014.
fissured labor market has become the new normal, producing outcomes different from those in a 
competitive labor market throughout the US. 
The Quantitative Evidence
While Weil was doing his case research, I and three co-authors were engaged in a seemingly 
unrelated quantitative analysis of earnings among all US workers (Barth, et al).  Using a classic 
analysis of variance model, we sought to estimate the part of the increased inequality of earnings that 
was due to increased inequality of pay among the establishments employing the workers and the part 
due to increased inequality of earnings within those establishments.  From confidential Census files, we 
calculated the variance of the log of earnings over time for establishments nationwide, controlling for 
industry and geographic location.  Since the average earnings of an establishment change when the 
composition of its work force changes and varies over time for idiosyncratic reasons, we sought to 
identify the “establishment fixed effect” that reflects whether the establishment was high or low paying 
regardless of skill mix or time period.  To do this we compared the earnings of workers with similar 
human capital characteristics across establishments over time and, separately, compared the earnings of 
the same worker when he/she remained at an establishment to the earnings of workers who moved to 
another establishment.  
Our statistical analysis found  that the divergence in earnings for similar workers among 
establishments in the US was large and ubiquitous, occurring in all industries and areas.  We found, 
moreover, that the increased variance of establishment-level earnings was due almost entirely to 
diverging establishment fixed effects rather than to changes in the composition of establishment work 
forces.  In our data, 80% of the increased earnings inequality among workers who remained with an  
establishment from one year to the next (which is the majority of the workforce) came from increased 
inequality of earnings among establishments as opposed to increased inequality within establishments.  
In addition, we found that the variance of establishment productivity (measured as revenue per worker) 
also increased greatly – indeed by more than the variance in establishment earnings. 
To link our analysis to the Boston cases, I show in table 2 the variance of the log of 
establishment-level earnings per worker in the hotel/accommodation industry in 1977 and 2007 for 
Boston and the US.  Both variances increase, indicating that average earnings of hotels/related 
establishments diverged over time.  The table also records the variance among all industries in Boston 
and the US, which increased even more, in part because average earnings among industries diverged 
over time as well. Measuring fissuring as the increased variance of establishment-level earnings, these 
data confirm that fissuring is indeed a truly big change in the labor market. 
Finally, I and my co-workers compared the increase in establishment-level earnings inequality 
to the increase in inequality among all workers.  Figure 1 shows that the increase in establishment-level 
inequality accounts for over half of the trend rise in inequality from 1992 to 20078,with the exact 
proportion varying from 56% to 65% depending on the calculation.  The road to understanding 
increasing inequality in the US lies through the divergence of compensation for similar workers 
among establishments and firms.
Interpreting the Fissured Labor Market
Analysts familiar with 1960s-1970s research on dual labor markets or with 1950s work on the 
balkanization of labor markets (Kerr) and variation of earnings by industry (Dunlop) may wonder in 
what ways beyond being a new term fissuring differs from the phenomenon in these investigations. 
The fissuring phenomenon in this essay differs from the variation of earnings in the same 
occupation or skill group examined in earlier work by being about changes in the variation of earnings 
among similar workers  rather than the level of variation. Analyzing the causes of the change in 
variation is more complicated than analyzing the factors that cause variation because one has to 
8 The period over which the Longitudinal Earnings and Household Data matches workers and establishments.
determine why causal factors had larger effects over time.  I suspect that advances in the information 
technology that monitors goods and services and worker performance has played an important role in 
the change but have no evidence on this.  However, changes over time provide an additional (time) 
dimension of variation that makes it easier to test competing explanations.
With unionization and collective bargaining in decline rapidly, the US labor market resembles 
more closely than before a competitive model where market forces determine outcomes.  This means 
that we must lodge explanations for the fissuring of earnings in the working of market forces – no easy 
task since the basic market model predicts that competition will reduce firm-based variation of earnings 
among comparable workers. Either our models misrepresent the way a relatively unfettered labor 
market works in reality or we are missing important market forces in applying the model. From either 
perspective the evidence of fissuring creates a great puzzle to labor economics and social science more 
broadly.  We need either a new “fissured market” model that goes beyond standard analysis or new 
measures of wage determinants in the existing framework, or some judicious mixture of the two.  
I would like to conclude that I have developed the new model and found the missing factors but 
that, sadly like Fermat with his Last Theorem, I lack the space to lay it out for you.  But that  
exaggerates what I know.  The fissuring process so puzzled me that the last time I was fortunate to see 
Gary Becker this year, I put the problem to him in the hope that his unique insight into the workings of 
the Invisible Hand might yield a critical clue to why market forces have failed thus far to reverse the 
widening of establishment-level differentials.  But Gary had no easy solution: “It's a hard problem but 
keep working on it” were his last words to me.  
The economics of fissuring is a hard problem. My believe is that as more researchers work on it 
– via case studies, insider econometrics of labor practices of firms and their subcontractors, analysis of 
establishment earnings in countries with different labor institutions – and apply insights from 
behavioral economics, game theory, and Beckerian price theory, we will advance our understanding  
enough to find ways to counter its effect on compensation.  May the next LERA review of this topic be 
titled “Farewell to the Fissured Labor Market”.
Table 1:  Earnings, Benefits and Work Activities in Boston establishments, 2013
Double-Tree Boston Union Harvard Entry level
Custodian
Hourly earnings $15.53 $18.51 $18.98
Workers annual contribution to 
health care
$3,134.00 $624 15% of lowest cost 
plan,  ~$972
Yearly Gross salary net of 
health-care (2080 hours per 
year)
$32,302.00 $38,500.00 $38,506.00
Rooms assigned to room 
attendant per day
28 rooms plus 
bathrooms
15  rooms plus 
bathrooms
Not applicable
Source:    Unite-Here Local 26, “Are Harvard's Double-Tree and Boston Union Hotels Really That 
Different?”   AGREEMENT Harvard University  and  Local 615  Service Employees  International 
Union November 16, 2011 - November 15, 2016 
Table 2 : Variance of Log of Establishment-level earnings and change in the Variance , 1977-2007
1977 2007 Change
Hotel Industry
  Boston 0.114 0.162 0.048
  US 0.168 0.209 0.041
All Industries
   Boston 0.353 0.624 0.271
  US 0.332 0.487 0.155
Source: Calculated from Census of establishments, 1977 and 2007
Figure 1: Percentage of Increased Inequality of Earnings Among Workers Attributable to Increased 
Inequality of Earnings in their Employing Establishments, 1992-2007
Source: BBDF: all workers, table 1;  with same observables, table 3; with same unobservables, table 2
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